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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the debates on the sources of the African growth constraint. It uses a tri-
variate structural VAR with a long-run identification scheme akin to the Blanchard and Quah 
method, to identify demand and supply shocks in 22 African countries between 1980 and 2005. 
Domestic supply shocks are the most important contributor to real output fluctuations in these 
countries. Contrary to expectations, the external shock played only a marginal role as a source of 
real output variation in the countries covered. A partial correlation analysis between the identified 
shocks and a measure of the fiscal policies of the countries reveal that fiscal policies pursued by 
these countries during the period are largely pro-cyclical. 
JEL Classification: E62, F41, F43 
Key Words: African countries; Structural VAR 
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1. Introduction 
The motivation of this paper is to address the on-going debate over the disappointing economic 
performance of African countries over recent decades, with specific attention to the identification of 
the sources of the economic constraints on economic growth.   
In 1957 Ghana, then the wealthiest nation in sub-Saharan Africa, had a per capita income almost 
equal to that of South Korea (US$ 490 against US$ 491 in 1980 dollars). By the early 1980s, Ghana’s 
annual income per head had fallen by nearly 20 per cent to US$400, while South Korea’s per capita 
GDP was, by then, over US$ 2,000. The UNDP’s 1990 Human Development Report suggests that 
South Korea had an annual purchasing power per head ten times greater than Ghana (US$ 4,832 
against US$ 481) based on 1987 statistics (The Economist, 26 May, 1990, p.81). Furthermore this 
was not just a country-specific problem, but an African problem. Collier and Gunning (1999), for 
example, note that African economic performance had been markedly worse than that of other 
regions, during the 1980s as per capita GDP declined by 1.3 percent per annum, five percent below 
the average for all low income developing countries. During 1990-94 the decline accelerated to 1.8 
percent per annum which, widened up the gap to 6.2 percentage points. For most of African 
countries, 1980s are considered as ‘a lost decade’ with slow, and even negative, growth 
commonplace (Fisher, 1991).  Since the mid-1990s economic performance in Africa seems to be 
improving, which is, perhaps attributable to structural adjustment programmes sponsored by the 
IMF and the World Bank.   
To identify the potential economic shocks to the African countries since 1980 we undertake a tri-
variate VAR analysis, following Dungey and Pagan (2000). For small open economies, like those in 
Africa, where external shocks are likely to be at least as important as domestic shocks in influencing 
the evolution of output growth and inflation, the tri-variate VAR is preferred to Blanchard and 
Quah’s (1980) more usual bi-variate VAR. In this framework in addition to domestic output growth 
and inflation world output growth is added to the model. This variable is assumed to be an 
important exogenous determinant of individual country exports, and therefore fluctuations in world 
output growth are likely to have significant effects on the domestic output growth and inflation.  A 
second contribution to the existing literature is to identify the contribution of national fiscal policies 
by a partial correlation analysis between the estimated shocks and a measure of fiscal policies of the 
countries studied.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses identification of aggregate 
supply and demand within a structural VAR. Section 3 analyses the data from our large sample of 22 
African countries and the results from the trivariate-VAR analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Aggregate Supply and Demand Shocks within an SVAR 
The SVAR methodology imposes structural restrictions, based on economic theory (Hoffmaister et al 
1998), on a Vector Autoregression (VAR). In particular, in a bi-variate VAR context, Blanchard and 
Quah (1989) interpreted the permanent shocks as aggregate supply shocks and transitory shocks as 
aggregate demand shocks. In an open economy context, a third-order VAR is necessary to capture 
potential effects from the rest of world onto domestic output growth and inflation (Dungey and 
Pagan, 2000). If the economy is assumed to be small then it is reasonable to assume that this 
economy has no effect on the world output.  
Let  and  represent the logs of real foreign output, the log of real domestic output and the 
domestic inflation rate, respectively. Then a tri-variate autoregressive (VAR) model can be set up to 
represent the small open economies of Africa as follows: 
                                                                                                (1) 
                                        (2) 
                                       (3) 
 
 where the constant terms are suppressed for notational convenience and the variables are 
differenced sufficiently to achieve stationarity. The structure of the system is that the real value of 
foreign output evolves independently of the other variables. Therefore, the foreign output equation 
includes neither current or lagged values of the other variables. The small country assumptions also 
mean that domestic output and inflation are allowed to depend on the current and past values of 
foreign output. The residuals ,  and  are assumed to be related to each other through 
different types of shocks, which are foreign productivity shocks, υ{t}, domestic demand shocks η{t} 
and domestic supply shocks, ε{t}. Since these shocks are not observable, they need to be identified 
from the VAR residuals. Let the relationship between the residuals and the innovations be given by 
                                                                                     (4) 
In the above system, there are fifteen unknowns to identify. These are nine elements, gij , of matrix 
G linking the VAR residuals and the structural innovations, three variances σ2v , σ2ε , σ2η and three 
covariances σ2v ε , σ2ε η , σ2ηv  in the variance-covariance matrix, Σ, of the structural innovations. From 
equation (4) the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR residuals Σe is denoted by 
                                                                                                                (5) 
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The elements of  provides six of the fifteen restrictions required for exact identification of the 
system. The Blanchard-Quah methodology is used for the additional six assumptions that all 
variances are unity, i.e.  and all co-variances are zero, which is 
.  The domestic supply shocks εt and domestic demand shocks ηt have no 
impacts on the large country, so g₁₂=g₁₃=0. Finally, demand shocks have no long-run effects on 
domestic output: 
                                                                                                    (6) 
These restrictions are adequate to identify the structural system. 
 Impulse response functions, variance decomposition analysis and a historical decomposition of the 
output effects of the structural shocks are considered with the view to investigate the plausibility of 
the identification presented here. 
Given that the domestic country is assumed to be small, world output growth is taken to be 
exogenous. Therefore, domestic shocks would not affect world output. A positive shock to foreign 
growth, probably from a global technological improvement or a favourable supply effect will affect 
the domestic supply. For example, a global supply shock would raise the domestic output growth 
and a favourable supply effects in terms of fall in oil prices (this might not be the case for oil 
exporting countries of Nigeria, Gabon and others included in the sample). The latter will improve the 
countries' terms of trade. This will impact on the domestic output positively. If global output shock 
represents a rise in world interest rates, there would be inter-temporal substitution effect and 
domestic output growth rises. Small open economies provide several channels by which 
disturbances in the world economy influence their performance. Shortfalls in world output or world 
interest rate fluctuations are good examples of exogenous macroeconomic dynamics that affect the 
business cycles of small open developing economies. Changes in world output can be seen as 
exogenous disturbances which affect the demand for the goods and services of small open 
economies. A fall in world output has a negative wealth effect and leads to a decline in domestic 
absorption and a real depreciation under both exchange rate regimes. 
A positive domestic supply shock increases output directly and therefore, the effect would be 
positive and persistent. A long-run neutrality of aggregate demand is assumed and as a result the 
shocks have no effect on the long-run path of domestic supply. The assumption is consistent with 
many macroeconomic models, which include Mundell-Fleming open-economy models, rational 
expectations sticky-wage models proposed by Fisher-Gray types and Lucas-Barro imperfect 
information models. All the same, the short-run interactions among the variables are freely 
determined by the model. 
This paper further links the identified shocks with the fiscal policy of the countries, to identify the 
cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy in these countries. The issue of pro-cyclicality and counter- cylicality 
of fiscal policy in developing countries is yet to be settled in the literature. An appreciable literature 
has argued that fiscal policy is in developing countries is pro-cyclical in contrast to industrial 
countries where it is argued that fiscal policy is either acyclical or countercyclical (Gavin and 
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Perotti,1997; Talvi and Végh,2005). At the other spectrum are those who claim that fiscal policy 
conducted in developing countries is counter-cyclical (Diallo, 2009). In line with Kaminsky, Reinhart, 
and Vegh (2004) and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008), this paper views fiscal measures from the policy 
instruments perspective, rather than from the outcomes (which could lie outside the policy makers' 
control). Two fiscal policy instruments are government consumption and tax rates. There are studies 
used fiscal deficit, which has been criticsed as not an appropriate measure of fiscal policy. This is 
because of the cyclicality of tax revenues. As we are unable to obtain data on tax rates, the paper 
uses data on government consumption as measure of fiscal policy. 
 
3. African growth: response to external and internal shocks 
3.1 Data Set 
The data is sourced from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. It is of monthly 
frequency, covers the period 1980:01-2005:12 and comprises of domestic real GDP, y, Foreign real 
GDP, y* and domestic CPI for each of the 22 African countries. Foreign real GDP is represented by US 
output, which is highly and significantly correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.73) with world 
output. The series were first logged and then subjected to battery of unit root tests that includes 
ADF, PP and KPSS to identify their level of integration. Table 1 shows that the series rejected 
stationarity in levels, but fail to reject stationarity in first differences. In addition, Johansen 
cointegration tests were used to determine if the variables are cointegrated or not. This is 
important, because if the series are cointegrated, an SVECM should be used in the place of an SVAR. 
The results indicate that variables are not cointegrated and therefore the SVAR was estimated for 
each of the countries covered. 
3.2  Sample Period 1980:1-2005:12     
The impulse response functions show the direction and the magnitude of an impact on a variable 
due to changes in another variable. A foreign supply shock should raise domestic output growth, put 
a downward pressure on inflation and improve trade balance. The responses of output and inflation 
to the US GDP, domestic supply and demand shocks are computed and reported in figure 1. The 
output of these countries does not seem to be sensitive to the external shock that emanates from 
the US GDP. For example only four countries' output responded to the US GDP shock. These are 
Botswana, Central Africa, Ethiopia and Nigeria. A positive US GDP shock has produced a positive, but 
insignificant responses from real output of Botswana, Central Africa and Egypt, albeit after a lag of 
about two quarters. However, Ethiopia's output responded to the shock by a mild contraction that 
persisted up to the tenth quarter. Nigeria's real GDP responded by an insignificant mild contraction 
up to the sixth quarter after the shock. Similar results were reported by Ahmed and Park (1994) for 
developed countries. 
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    A positive supply shock is expected to have a persistent positive effect on the domestic supply 
growth. A positive supply shocks have resulted in a positive and sustained response by the real 
output from the period contemporaneous to the shock up to the tenth quarter in all the countries. 
However, the magnitude varies from country to country. Zambia recorded a 3% positive response 
during the period immediately after the shock whereas six countries' output responded by a 2% rise 
during the period contemporaneous to the shock. These are Gabon, Ghana, Libya, Malawi, 
Mauritania and Tanzania. The rest of the countries recorded about 1% output rise due to domestic 
supply shock, except Egypt, Mauritius and Tunisia, where immediate response to the shock was less 
than 0.5%. The degree of persistence also varies among the countries. In many countries, the 
response of the output has risen to between 3% and 4% by the second and sixth quarter, where it 
mostly stayed up to the tenth quarter. These are Algeria, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Libya, Malawi 
and Tanzania. A positive domestic supply shock produced different responses from the countries. In 
four of the countries the response was a decline in inflation. Algeria, Egypt, Ghana and Tunisia 
responded by a different degree of fall in their CPI, although in some instances insignificant. 
    A positive domestic demand shock has yielded a non significant response by the real GDP of the 
countries covered, except in Benin and Senegal. Inflation has also responded insignificantly to the 
foreign supply shocks in all the countries. However, responses of inflation to the domestic supply 
shock are significant in Benin, Central Africa and Senegal. A positive demand shock has induced a 
positive and significant rise in inflation in all the countries, except in Gabon. 
    It is evident from the results that output of countries of Botswana and Mauritania has responded 
by positively to a positive shock of the US GDP. Botswana's main exports are diamond which appears 
to be sensitive to external shocks. Mauritania's main exports are iron ore and gold, which constitute 
about 60% of the country's exports. In Central Africa where diamonds account for about half of the 
country's exports, the domestic output responded to an external positive shock by an insignificant 
rise. Egypt is increasingly becoming an important gold exporting country. The results indicate that its 
output responded positively to external shocks like other countries in this category. The results also 
highlights role of price distortion in these economies. For example countries that operate one form 
of price control or the other recorded a rise in inflation when there is a positive shock to the 
domestic aggregate supply. These countries include Benin, Cameroon, Central Africa, Gabon and 
Senegal. However, other countries that do not belong to this category recorded decline inflation as a 
result of a positive domestic supply shock, albeit in some cases insignificant. For example, in Egypt 
where the price controls were dismantled in the 1991 reforms, a positive shock to the domestic 
supply resulted in a decline in the country's inflation. 
    Impulse response analysis is useful in considering the signs and magnitude of responses to specific 
shocks. However, the relative importance of shocks for a given variable fluctuations is assessed is 
better assessed through the variance decompositions. Table 1(a) to 1(u) present variance 
decomposition of real output and inflation to US GDP, supply and demand shocks. Foreign shocks 
have not significantly impacted on the domestic output of these countries, except in Egypt, Gabon 
and Ghana where foreign shock accounted for more than 10% of domestic output variations. Gabon 
recorded the highest of 14%. But in the remaining countries, the US GDP shocks accounted for less 
than 10% of the domestic output changes for up to ten years period. Domestic supply shock is the 
most important source of domestic real output variations in all the countries covered. However, its 
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relative significance seem to declined in some countries. For example, in Nigeria and Senegal, the 
supply shocks accounted for about 99% of output fluctuations, but its contribution in both countries 
declined to about 68% by the 30th quarter. The influence of demand shocks on domestic output 
varies across the countries. However, its relative importance is generally low as it accounts less than 
20% of output variations in all the countries, except in Senegal where the influence of demand shock 
on her output is about 30%. The external shock has impacted less on the inflation of the countries, 
accounting between 3-21% of their inflation. South Africa recorded the highest influence of foreign 
output on her inflation. Domestic supply shocks contribution to inflation varies from one country to 
another. In Algeria, Central Africa, Benin, Ethiopia, Malawi and Senegal, between 20 over 40% of 
variations in inflation are attributable to the domestic supply shocks. However, domestic supply 
shocks is responsible for less than 10% of inflation in Botswana, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia. The most important source of inflation in 
the countries is the demand shock, which is responsible for about 50-90% of inflation in the 
countries, except in Senegal where the dominant contributor is the foreign output shock. The 
country where its highest influence is recorded is Zambia. On the whole, Domestic supply shocks are 
the most of the shocks in explaining movements in domestic output. This means that policies that 
aim at improving country-specific supply constrained would be more fruitful in raising the 
economies' economic growth rate. 
    External shocks are very important to inflation of Gabon, where it accounted for over 90% of 
inflation variation in that country. Over 20% of South Africa's inflation was due to the external 
shocks. This could be explained by the fact that U.S., which is used as a proxy for foreign countries, is 
the largest trade partner of the country as about third of her exports/imports are to and from the 
U.S. Countries where demand shocks have shown relative importance to their output are Nigeria 
and Senegal, where the demand shocks have contributed to more than 20% of their output 
variation. 
  3.3 Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy is measured as real government consumption.  A partial correlation analysis between 
the shocks and a fiscal measure are reported in Table 3 reveals that the fiscal policy pursued by the 
countries is procyclical. Only results for Central Africa and Morocco appear to suggest that fiscal 
policy in these two countries is countercyclical. The results are consistent with reported findings 
from other developing countries that includes Gavin and Perotti (1997), Talvi and Végh (2005) and 
Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008). The countries that have high and significant coefficients are Botswana, 
Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, and Uganda, where the coefficients range between 0.9 and 0.5. The 
countries with the lowest coefficients are Cameroon, Kenya, Mauritania and Senegal and apart from 
Kenya, the coefficients are also insignificant. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper investigated demand and supply shocks in 22 African countries, with an aim of identifying 
sources and importance of these shocks. An SVAR that uses a long-run restriction schemes proposed 
by Blanchard and Quah was used in identifying the shocks. Domestic supply shocks resulted in a 
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sustained rise in real GDP of all the countries covered. Foreign supply shocks have produced a 
positive real output responses in Botswana, Egypt, Gabon, Mauritania and Tunisia, reflecting 
importance of solid minerals in their exports. These countries' exports have large contents of 
mineral resources in their exports and as it is evident from the results, the higher the content, the 
larger the response. Domestic demand shocks did not produce any significant response in real 
output of the countries, except in Senegal and Benin. Inflation has responded positively to the 
demand shocks in all the countries, except in Gabon, where it is the foreign output shock that 
induced a positive rise in inflation. The most important source of real output variations in these 
countries is the supply shock, which accounted between 70-95% of output variations in these 
countries. Foreign shocks were less influential than the demand shocks in real output of the 
countries, except in Gabon. 
    A partial correlation analysis between the shocks and a fiscal measure of the countries indicated 
that fiscal policy undertaken by these countries during the sample period was pro-cyclical, which 
agrees with most of the findings reported from other developing countries. 
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Figure 1. Impulse Responses 
(a) Algeria 
Real GDP Responses 
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response  to US GDP Shocks
 
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response  to Domestic Supply Shocks
 
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of to Demand Shocks
 
Inflation Responses 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to US GDP Shocks
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Domestic Supply Shocks
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Demand Shocks
 
(b) Benin  
Real GDP Responses 
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of to US GDP Shocks
 
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Domestic Supply Shocks
 
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of to Demand Shocks
 
Inflation Responses 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to US GDP Shocks
 -4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Domestic Supply Shocks
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Demand Shocks
 
13 
 
(c) Botswana 
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(e) Central Africa 
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(g) Ethiopia 
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(h) Gabon  
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(i) Ghana 
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(k) Libya 
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(m)Mauritania 
Real GDP Responses 
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of to US GDP Shocks
 
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Domestic Supply Shocks
 
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Demand Shocks
 
Inflation Responses 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to US GDP Shocks
 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Domestic Supply Shocks
 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Demand Shocks
 
(n) Mauritius  
Real GDP Responses 
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response  to US GDP Shocks
 
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Domestic Supply Shocks
 
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Demand Shocks
 
Inflation Responses 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to  US GDP Shocks
 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Domestic Supply Shocks
 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response to Demand Shocks
 
19 
 
(0) Morocco 
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(q) Senegal 
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(s) Tanzania 
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(u) Uganda 
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Table 1: Unit Root Tests 
No. Country Variables 
ADF PP KPSS 
Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff 
1. Algeria LGDP -1.39 -2.92
** -2.16 -8.24** 1.14# 0.12 
LCPI -1.66 -2.98** -0.16 -7.39** 1.08 # 0.25 
2. Benin LGDP -0.77 -2.91** -0.8  -7.40 ** 1.12# 0.10  
LCPI -2.69 -8.44** -2.53  -21.85** 2.02# 0.00  
3. Botswana LGDP -1.62 -5.01** -1.20 -8.35** 1.13# 0.20 
LCPI -1.59 -6.07** -2.89 -10.68** 0.47# 0.12 
4. Cameroun LGDP -1.89 -2.93** -1.97 -7.75** 1.12# 0.20 
LCPI -0.83 -6.95** 0.82 -6.94** 1.12# 0.08 
5. Central Africa LGDP -1.78 -4.68** -2.34 -6.55** 1.22# 0.26 
LCPI -1.06 -6.83** 0.83 -6.82** 1.12# 0.06 
6. Egypt LGDP -1.03 -3.05** -1.29 -10.26** 1.14# 0.16 
LCPI -1.31 -6.68** -1.35 -6.79** 1.14 0.32 
7. Ethiopia LGDP -0.75 -3.50** -0.74 -7.60** 1.15# 0.16 
LCPI -0.74 -4.53** -0.58 -7.37** 1.23# 0.14 
8. Gabon LGDP -0.48 -4.34** -0.61 -6.70** 1.19# 0.05 
LCPI -1.59 -6.69** -1.65 -6.73** 1.12# 0.09 
9. Ghana LGDP -0.65 -4.32** -0.64 -5.52** 0.90# 0.14 
LCPI 3.41 -3.95** 7.96 -5.42** 1.02# 0.31 
10. Kenya LGDP -1.51 -4.76** -1.22 -8.51** 1.14# 0.22 
LCPI -1.49 -7.65** -1.39 -7.63** 1.17# 0.06 
11. Libya LGDP 1.42 -4.00** -0.32 -7.35** 1.15# 0.04 
LCPI -1.82 -2.94** -1.75 -7.70** 1.07# 0.03 
12. Malawi LGDP 0.28 -3.85** 0.58 -8.43** 1.13# 0.22 
LCPI -0.72 -4.71** 5.73 -8.78** 1.01# 0.23 
13. Mauritania LGDP -0.35 -4.10** -0.01 -8.24** 1.15# 0.05 
LCPI 2.08 -8.69** 1.98 -8.79** 1.20# 0.32 
14. Mauritius LGDP -0.30 -4.32** -0.86 -12.26** 1.14# 0.11 
LCPI 3.78 -7.70** 3.18 -8.02** 1.13# 0.21 
15. Morocco LGDP -1.26 -4.77** -0.89 -9.67** 1.11# 0.04 
LCPI -2.46 -9.60** -2.63 -9.64** 1.13# 0.09 
16 Nigeria LGDP 0.23 -3.18** 1.03 -6.33** 1.07# 0.42 
LCPI 0.50 -8.57** 0.56 -8.49** 1.12# 0.07 
17 Senegal LGDP 0.35 -3.79** -0.01 -7.40** 1.24# 0.09 
LCPI -1.25 -8.54** -1.22 -8.63** 1.18# 0.09 
18 South Africa LGDP -2.76 -3.79** -2.41 -7.39** 1.24# 0.07 
LCPI -2.87 -5.47** -2.04 -5.13** 1.13# 0.01 
19 Tanzania LGDP -1.90 -4.28** -1.46 -8.60** 1.12# 0.30 
LCPI -2.69 -5.18** 0.93 -10.14** 1.08# 0.32 
20 Tunisia LGDP 1.10 -4.08** 1.06 -8.58** 1.14# 0.22 
LCPI -0.65 -4.83** -0.56 -5.12** 1.19# 0.12 
21 Uganda LGDP -0.86 -3.08** -0.39 -7.86** 1.10# 0.09 
LCPI 0.79 -8.28** 0.57 -8.35** 1.11# 0.27 
22 Zambia LGDP -1.66 -6.08** -0.56 -8.75** 1.12# 0.20 
LCPI 0.49 -9.08** -0.39 -9.09** 1.15# 0.23 
**  and # signify rejection of the null at 5% level of significance.  
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Table 2 
Variance Decompositions 
(a) Algeria 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(b) Benin 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period US GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
US GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1 0.697599 99.30240 0.000000 0.135179 99.86482 0.000000 
4 1.319167 95.81604 2.864796 1.123328 86.74560 12.13107 
8 1.121261 94.82389 4.054847 3.661426 83.33741 13.00117 
12 0.974957 93.65991 5.365129 3.730439 82.21944 14.05013 
20 0.848007 91.06307 8.088923 3.738947 82.15733 14.10372 
30 0.796416 89.11219 10.09139 3.755063 82.03315 14.21178 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
US GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1 1.314343 0.404809 98.28085 3.352159 0.383648 96.26419 
4 1.912087 3.802834 94.28508 3.391468 26.16956 70.43898 
8 2.096226 11.47596 86.42781 3.096229 35.58237 61.32140 
12 2.159426 16.84905 80.99153 3.308824 35.62448 61.06669 
20 2.077913 21.46978 76.45231 3.315946 35.96312 60.72094 
30 1.999664 23.84811 74.15223 3.318753 35.98966 60.69158 
(c) Botswana 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(d) Cameroon 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
US GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1 3.139049 96.86095 0.000000 0.152395 99.84760 0.000000 
4 8.959465 86.92816 4.112373 2.450423 96.08224 1.467342 
8 8.157334 83.34474 8.497930 2.936212 93.66187 3.401922 
12 8.022418 84.54211 7.435471 3.099937 92.44003 4.460034 
20 8.071869 84.96298 6.965149 3.262621 91.57599 5.161386 
30 8.018019 85.30063 6.681352 3.310156 91.36872 5.321122 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
US GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1 1.728150 0.223229 98.04862 0.760715 0.062224 99.17706 
4 4.632431 4.455278 90.91229 2.392645 3.072200 94.53516 
8 6.337457 5.090593 88.57195 3.831946 7.019245 89.14881 
12 6.770689 5.064453 88.16486 4.277224 8.284746 87.43803 
20 6.994070 5.145714 87.86022 4.312025 8.726697 86.96128 
30 7.015931 5.157453 87.82662 4.309978 8.854381 86.83564 
(e) Central Africa Republic 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(f) Egypt 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
US GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
4 2.464903 93.89102 3.644080 1.189876 98.81012 0.000000 
1 2.154552 97.84545 0.000000 5.778992 91.18669 3.034320 
8 5.944772 88.48952 5.565709 11.61283 80.78628 7.600884 
12 6.074277 88.12934 5.796381 11.68917 80.89487 7.415963 
20 6.305047 87.84564 5.849310 11.89244 80.65995 7.447611 
30 6.323049 87.82361 5.853340 11.97479 80.59596 7.429252 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
US GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1 0.738759 0.442552 98.81869 0.048876 0.013569 99.93756 
4 1.750316 26.32616 71.92352 0.119168 7.888055 91.99278 
8 3.067606 27.83053 69.10186 1.731025 9.046626 89.22235 
12 4.721425 28.33871 66.93987 2.129253 9.465143 88.40560 
20 4.866925 28.56622 66.56686 2.221445 9.820932 87.95762 
30 4.883234 28.58933 66.52743 2.251901 9.920681 87.82742 
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Table 2 
Variance Decompositions 
(g) Ethiopia 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(h) Gabon 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1 0.479377 99.52062 0.000000 0.129712 99.87029 0.000000 
4 8.352452 89.49849 2.149060 2.598500 97.09914 0.302362 
8 7.513766 86.24275 6.243487 12.61881 84.34973 3.031462 
12 6.514348 85.62970 7.855956 13.86917 82.35359 3.777237 
20 5.911580 84.26661 9.821813 14.44197 81.66495 3.893079 
30 5.600261 83.74670 10.65304 14.47827 81.61639 3.905349 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1 0.287772 0.188646 99.52358 98.20162 0.007283 1.791096 
4 2.414337 7.913673 89.67199 85.02673 11.25738 3.715884 
8 3.797290 13.64155 82.56116 81.99757 13.97521 4.027224 
12 5.575889 15.05473 79.36938 80.14147 15.76745 4.091085 
20 5.519622 17.95117 76.52921 79.40028 16.39592 4.203797 
30 5.405677 19.64493 74.94939 79.37767 16.41640 4.205926 
(i) Ghana 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(j) Kenya 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1 0.948023 99.05198 0.000000  0.409052  99.59095  0.000000 
4 8.157540 91.04738 0.795084  0.371236  99.22212  0.406640 
8 11.59851 85.84332 2.558164  1.611625  95.89511  2.493262 
12 11.16919 82.76995 6.060863  1.781171  95.23749  2.981342 
20 11.02019 80.46502 8.514792  1.729888  95.07788  3.192232 
30 11.04960 79.38328 9.567118  1.677671  95.01054  3.311785 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.012081  0.988645  98.99927  6.619090  0.009465  93.37145 
4  3.514152  7.484227  89.00162  8.119859  1.788591  90.09155 
8  6.340093  11.69651  81.96340  9.843909  3.389220  86.76687 
12  7.191480  12.97630  79.83222  10.33944  5.291002  84.36956 
20  7.239602  13.29020  79.47020  10.17049  7.170474  82.65904 
30  7.279925  13.48217  79.23791  10.07751  8.436345  81.48615 
(k) Libya 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(l) Malawi 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand 
Shocks 
US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.379312  99.62069  0.000000  0.089157  99.91084  0.000000 
4  1.834764  97.92614  0.239100  0.327360  95.70023  3.972406 
8  3.290019  92.54507  4.164909  1.141665  94.93488  3.923451 
12  3.399166  88.75001  7.850828  1.228336  94.37930  4.392364 
20  3.664106  86.29047  10.04543  1.363493  92.63320  6.003304 
30  3.764561  85.52276  10.71268  1.415634  89.99254  8.591830 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.456643  0.104375  99.43898  0.000832  4.182117  95.81705 
4  5.088087  0.448835  94.46308  1.098662  5.236041  93.66530 
8  6.527052  0.507621  92.96533  1.272701  7.951434  90.77586 
12  7.524410  0.661936  91.81365  1.397055  10.39482  88.20813 
20  8.250193  1.055560  90.69425  1.619632  15.51283  82.86754 
30  8.292084  1.379007  90.32891  1.922339  21.01767  77.05999 
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Table 2 
Variance Decompositions 
(m) Mauritania 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(n) Mauritius 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.341140  99.65886  0.000000  1.650680  98.34932  0.000000 
4  0.285520  97.32375  2.390734  1.439080  98.09559  0.465330 
8  0.329365  96.93890  2.731730  0.917985  98.31001  0.772006 
12  0.342350  96.84188  2.815767  0.913677  98.06674  1.019579 
20  0.342441  96.82494  2.832623  0.893354  97.94582  1.160822 
30  0.342566  96.82009  2.837345  0.871667  97.91429  1.214042 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.242112  0.041890  99.71600  5.892880  4.058424  90.04870 
4  1.186943  3.776650  95.03641  7.667576  5.215885  87.11654 
8  1.298330  5.096483  93.60519  7.821074  7.016395  85.16253 
12  1.297166  5.512266  93.19057  8.396674  7.193949  84.40938 
20  1.294359  5.766615  92.93903  8.374595  7.292513  84.33289 
30  1.294100  5.793982  92.91192  8.372648  7.363108  84.26424 
(o) Morocco 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(p) Nigeria 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.060205  99.93979  0.000000  0.183057  99.81694  0.000000 
4  0.599076  96.87550  2.525420  3.775915  95.05124  1.172844 
8  6.277502  90.80418  2.918315  9.732592  79.88312  10.38428 
12  5.946612  91.06283  2.990558  9.303063  70.73596  19.96098 
20  5.651234  91.26708  3.081684  9.260990  69.70403  21.03498 
30  5.415327  91.49998  3.084696  9.039772  67.81870  23.14153 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.114766  2.535742  97.34949  0.001189  0.022156  99.97665 
4 1.203512  3.337419  95.45907  0.938649  5.660758  93.40059 
8  2.793708  3.999742  93.20655  2.342962  7.760214  89.89682 
12  2.977792  5.100876  91.92133  2.695416  9.849148  87.45544 
20  3.047471  6.072823  90.87971  2.527979  9.338862  88.13316 
30  3.048741  6.582463  90.36880  2.409436  9.622358  87.96821 
(q) Senegal 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(r) South Africa 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1 0.259468 99.74053 0.000000 1.120657 98.87934 0.000000 
4 0.223169 82.85547 16.92137 1.139210 94.32366 4.537125 
8 2.193185 74.13200 23.67482 2.474951 90.07819 7.446864 
12 2.564259 71.14698 26.28876 2.622265 88.72255 8.655189 
20 2.486433 68.90421 28.60936 2.536647 88.23583 9.227519 
30 2.428857 68.03732 29.53382 2.528947 88.11764 9.353412 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1 0.502992 2.842035 96.65497 1.218182 0.009633 98.77218 
4 2.873270 39.65645 57.47028 18.73362 1.758078 79.50830 
8 4.965927 40.35368 54.68039 21.95426 4.570347 73.47540 
12 4.823426 41.75256 53.42401 20.90553 6.176654 72.91781 
20 4.626647 42.02510 53.34826 21.07563 6.653437 72.27094 
30 4.520969 42.07036 53.40868 21.05664 6.749669 72.19370 
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Table 2 
Variance Decompositions 
(s) Tanzania 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(t) Tunisia 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
US GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1  0.267935  99.73206  0.000000  0.177848  99.82215  0.000000 
4  0.235151  99.67094  0.093909  1.716712  97.81600  0.467286 
8  0.464650  99.42163  0.113725  7.262075  86.36504  6.372888 
12  0.469849  99.41750  0.112648  7.446272  86.47764  6.076086 
20  0.404623  99.43677  0.158602  7.150791  87.03960  5.809606 
30  0.363671  99.34512  0.291212  7.101498  87.44934  5.449165 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
US GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1  0.243317  0.304568  99.45211  1.782702  0.000271  98.21703 
4  3.461808  0.153008  96.38518  1.972222  2.922940  95.10484 
8  2.831523  0.413912  96.75456  2.893487  7.738044  89.36847 
12  2.507026  1.062736  96.43024  3.032093  10.30799  86.65991 
20  2.212598  3.434465  94.35294  3.275172  10.76633  85.95849 
30  1.985756  7.228150  90.78609  3.330233  11.54321  85.12655 
(u) Uganda 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(v) Zambia 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
US GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1  0.051005  99.94899  0.000000  1.099030  98.90097  0.000000 
4  1.418046  96.82325  1.758707  3.789984  96.18779  0.022223 
8  2.676919  93.01603  4.307050  6.791105  93.04929  0.159609 
12  3.223317  91.49613  5.280556  7.981458  91.77073  0.247812 
20  3.501586  90.95756  5.540850  8.793665  90.79196  0.414371 
30  3.566082  90.85069  5.583232  9.150702  90.35322  0.496081 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
US GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1  0.124065  0.246888  99.62905  0.030485  0.008646  99.96087 
4  0.460843  2.260634  97.27852  1.068879  0.375578  98.55554 
8  2.866493  6.197755  90.93575  3.043479  0.575072  96.38145 
12  3.572738  6.788654  89.63861  3.209379  0.592822  96.19780 
20  3.567315  6.762468  89.67022  3.246050  0.614153  96.13980 
30  3.554947  6.746145  89.69891  3.247690  0.632784  96.11953 
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Table 3 
Partial Correlation Analysis 
No. Country Supply Demand 
1. Algeria 0.28 
(2.97) 
-0.28 
 (-2.90) 
2. Benin 0.18 
 (1.87) 
-0.11 
 (-1.12) 
3 Botswana 0.53 
 (6.22) 
-0.40  
(-4.36) 
4. Cameroon 0.08  
(0.81) 
-0.08 
 (-0.81) 
5. Central Africa -0.26  
(-2.65) 
0.22 
 (2.27) 
6. Egypt 0.39 
 (4.25) 
-0.36 
 (-3.83) 
7. Ethiopia 0.28 
 (2.92) 
-0.35 
 (-3.78) 
8. Gabon 0.08 
 (0.82) 
0.22  
(2.25) 
9. Ghana 0.59 
 (7.30) 
-0.69  
(-9.61) 
10. Kenya 0.04 
 (0.40) 
-0.03 
 (-0.26) 
11. Libya 0.48  
(5.50) 
-0.50  
(-5.67) 
12. Malawi 0.94 
 (27.96) 
-0.95 
 (-30.05 
13. Mauritania 0.17 
 (1.69) 
-0.16 
 (-1.67) 
14. Mauritius 0.75 
 (11.23) 
-0.76 
 (-11.63) 
15. Morocco -0.44 
 (-4.94) 
0.46  
(5.26) 
16. Nigeria 0.47  
(5.35) 
-0.51 
 (-5.94) 
17. Senegal 0.01 
 (0.09) 
-0.01 
 (-0.12) 
18. South Africa 0.46 
 (5.43) 
-0.50 
 (-5.73) 
19. Tanzania 0.23 
 (2.42) 
-0.23  
(-2.32) 
20. Tunisia 0.21 
 (2.17) 
-0.18 
 (-1.83) 
21. Uganda 0.53  
(6.23) 
-0.45 
 (-5.09) 
22. Zambia 0.39 
 (4.30) 
-0.52 
 (-6.11) 
Figures in the parenthesis are t-ratios 
 
